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 1 
Introduction 
The recent devolution reforms in the UK represent one of most fundamental changes to the 
Constitution in the 20th Century. However, the UK has not been alone in undertaking moves 
towards greater decentralisation. Whilst other countries have not necessarily followed the 
UK’s route of decentralisation through constitutional reform, many European countries (eg 
France, Spain and Italy) have introduced greater fiscal powers for regional and local 
authorities. A casual glance at the UK’s current position suggests that, in some respects at 
least, it still retains a highly centralised fiscal system. The degree of fiscal autonomy enjoyed 
by the UK’s constituent nations and local authorities is still limited compared to that in other 
OECD countries. 
 
The purpose of this article is the following. First, we provide a comparison of the degree of 
fiscal decentralisation in the UK with that in other countries, and assess the extent to which 
different areas of public expenditure are assigned to different tiers of government. Second, 
we assess the degree of fiscal autonomy in the UK compared to that in other OECD 
countries. We also provide some insights from the theory of fiscal federalism to assess 
whether the current degree of fiscal autonomy in the UK is optimal, or whether there are 
useful lessons to be learned from other economies. One key conclusion here is that, although 
there would seem to be good reasons to increase the degree of fiscal autonomy in the UK, one 
might want to proceed with caution. We also discuss whether other OECD countries offer 
useful models in terms of the method of allocation of block grants, the allocation of taxation 
to other tiers of government, and the way in which are used to achieve the twin objectives of 
fiscal efficiency and equity. Finally, we consider whether the ‘asymmetric nature’ of UK 
devolution, with different national and regional units being assigned different degrees of 
autonomy, represents a desirable model in the light of experiences elsewhere in Europe. 
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In the next section, we outline the division of spending responsibilities between different tiers 
of government in the OECD economies. Then we compare the degrees of fiscal autonomy, 
and assess whether further reform is warranted in the case of the UK. In subsequent sections, 
we consider how the mixed use of central grants, shared taxation and devolved taxation can 
impact on the objectives of efficiency and equity; discuss the extent to which different sub-
central governments have autonomy on borrowing; and examine how fiscal federalism is 
evolving in different countries. The final section draws conclusions. 
 
The Division of Spending Responsibilities between Jurisdictions 
 
There are sharp differences between the OECD economies in the role played by regional and 
local government in the provision of public services (see Table 11). Even if one focuses solely 
on the EU economies, it is immediately apparent that some countries operate highly 
decentralised systems for the delivery of public services. First, the differences between 
countries with ‘federal’ and ‘unitary’ structures is more apparent than real2. While some 
federations tend to assign major welfare (health, education and social welfare) functions to  
 
 
 
1 European Communities (2001) uses figures based on countries’ own definitions, so data are not strictly 
comparable across countries. The IMF data presented in Table 1 uses consistent definitions both across 
countries and over time. A caveat is that local expenditures mandated by central government, or spent on its 
behalf, appear as sub-central expenditures. This may overestimate the extent of decentralisation (see Ebel and 
Yilmaz, 2002). 
2 Spain is not strictly a federation and is often referred to as a ‘quasi-federal’ or ‘regionalised state’ since the 
Spanish constitution does not include a federal distribution of powers and the Parliament can transfer legislative 
and executive functions without any statutory reform. See Russell Barter (2000) for a more detailed typology of 
forms of regional government. 
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Table 1: The Functional Distribution of Public Expenditure by Level of Government 
 
 General 
Public 
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Australia 46 46 8 100 0 0 13 83 3 28 72 1 52 47 1 90 8 1 23 44 33 20 46 34 33 51 16 80 18 2 
Canada  63 16 21 100 0 0 34 33 33 6 57 38 4 95 1 69 27 4 26 34 40 31 19 50 24 45 31 65 31 4 
Germany  38 34 28 100 0 0 8 72 21 4 68 27 72 12 15 79 11 11 7 26 53 4 33 63 46 35 18 63 31 6 
USA 68 13 19 100 0 0 19 27 54 5 44 52 58 31 11 69 23 8 43 5 51 24 10 66 40 38 22 58 22 20 
Switzerland 41 27 31 90 5 5 7 67 26 10 55 35 56 25 19 77 15 8 15 24 61 13 32 55 73 2 25 56 25 20 
Spain  44 17 40 100 0 0 59 15 26 29 65 6 37 60 3 94 4 2 7 19 74 16 27 57 40 37 23 84 7 9 
 
Unitary 
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Denmark  72 - 28 100 - 0 87 - 13 53 - 47 5 - 95 45 - 55 67 - 33 45 - 55 65 - 35 97 - 3 
France  74 - 26 100 - 0 72 - 28 63 - 37 98 - 2 91 - 9 18 - 82 27 - 73 83 - 17 85 - 15 
Norway 66 - 34 100 - 0 83 - 17 37 - 63 23 - 77 81 - 19 13 - 87 35 - 65 82 - 18 90 - 10 
Netherlands 71 - 29 100 - 0 75 - 25 67 - 33 95 - 5 86 - 14 21 - 79 17 - 83 74 - 26 85 - 15 
UK 78 - 22 100 - 0 48 - 52 33 - 67 100 - 0 80 - 20 59 - 41 35 - 65 71 - 29 91 - 9 
  
Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics 2001 edition. 
regional/state jurisdictions, others do not, or retain control over some key functions (eg 
Health in Germany and France and Social Security in all cases except Denmark). Some  
unitary countries,  the Scandinavian countries, have extremely devolved systems. In 
Denmark, for instance, counties and municipalities accounted for 76% of all public sector 
staff in 1998, and 56% of total expenditure by the public sector (European Communities, 
2001). Following the reform of local government in 1970, Danish municipalities have been 
responsible for a wide range of local services, ranging from primary education to care of the 
elderly and the distribution of benefit payments. 
 
Even if one looks beyond the countries in Table 1 for which consistent data is available3, one 
finds that some federal EU countries retain a large amount of central control over these key 
functions (eg Austria) 4. Again, we find that some unitary countries have engaged in 
considerable decentralisation. In Sweden, municipalities and counties undertake 35% of 
public sector spending, with medical care assigned mainly to county councils and education 
(up to secondary schooling) mainly to municipalities. 
Second, a number of EU economies have moved toward greater decentralisation of spending. 
Again these data are only available on a consistent basis for some countries.  
Table 2 shows that in Spain, for instance, the share of total government spending carried out 
by sub-central government rose from 28% in 1980 to 36% in 1997. There has been a major 
shift to assign spending to the regions (Autonomous Communities, ACs). Whilst functions 
such as health and education have progressively been devolved to ACs, many competencies 
 
3 The surveys in European Communities (2001) use figures based on countries’ own definitions, so data are not 
strictly comparable across countries. The data in Table 1 uses consistent definitions across countries and over 
time. One caveat remains: that local expenditures mandated by central government or spent on its behalf appear 
as sub-central expenditures, and this may overestimate the extent of decentralization (see Ebel and Yilmaz 
(2002)). 
4 Austria, Italy and Sweden were omitted from Table 1 since the required breakdown by function is not available 
in IMF Government Financial Statistics for these countries. Note that in the Table ‘Economic Affairs and 
Services’ includes spending on Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing, Hunting, Mining, Manufacturing, Construction, 
Transport and Communications and “other” Economic Affairs and Services. 
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remain shared between the four tiers of government (State, ACs, provinces and 
municipalities). In Italy, regions were given greater powers in the 1970s and 1980s and now 
have primary responsibility over matters such as health, vocational education and training, 
economic development, public works and the environment5. In recent years, as we shall see 
below, there have been major changes in the 1990s to reform the financing of local 
authorities, with a move towards greater fiscal autonomy. A similar, though less marked trend 
is visible in France, where there were considerable moves to devolve spending powers to 
regional and local authorities, though many services are provided in collaboration between 
tiers of government rather than assigned exclusively.6. In most countries, a more marked shift 
is evident in the share of sub-central expenditure on goods and services only. 
 
Third, when compared to other EU countries, the UK has always had a lower than average 
degree of decentralisation of its spending functions (see Table 2). Whilst the nature of the 
lower tiers of government has changed with devolution, this has not greatly affected the 
degree to which expenditure is assigned to sub-national jurisdictions. 
 
Economic theory suggests that allocating expenditure decisions close to the citizen will lead 
to a more efficient outcome, with local electorates being able to determine the allocation of 
public spending on different services in a way that best suits the local electorate. 
This is what lies behind the Tiebout (1956) model of consumer choice, whereby consumers 
will choose to locate in jurisdictions that will provide them with the mix of public services 
that optimise their welfare. Oates’ (1972) classic work on fiscal federalism also suggests that 
jurisdictions should be designed, and the assignment of public expenditures should be carried 
out, in such a way that services are provided by the jurisdiction representing the smallest 
 
5 Although this is not apparent from Table 2, because the most significant phase of decentralisation, from the 
perspective of spending took place before 1985. Over the 1970-85 period, sub-central government spending 
doubled from 7 to 14 per cent of GDP (see Bibbee and Goglio (2002). 
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possible area over which the benefits are distributed. The notion is to combine the most 
efficient allocation of public goods whilst avoiding taste differences (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 
1980). 
 
Table 2: Sub-Central Government Expenditure as a Percentage of General  
Government Expenditure 
Total Expenditure        Expenditure on Goods and Services 
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  Australia  46 50 48 50 9       Australia  65 64 64 66 1 
  Canada 58 57 58 60 3       Canada 77 79 81 82 7 
  Germany2 40 40 38 35 -13       Germany 53 53 53 47 -10 
  Switzerland3 51 51 49 49 -4       Switzerland 36 58 60 63 77 
  USA 38 41 45 48 26       USA 67 64 63 61 -9 
  Spain 28 33 30 36 29       Spain 55 61 69 70 26 
 
 
Unitary Countries 1
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%
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  Denmark  54 54 54 56 4       Denmark  68 69 69 70 2 
  France  17 18 19 18 6       France  26 29 31 33 28 
  Italy .. .. 23 25 9       Italy .. .. 54 51 -6 
  Netherlands  32 28 28 26 -19       Netherlands  50 48 50 52 4 
  Norway  36 36 37 38 6       Norway  64 63 65 65 3 
  Sweden 38 39 33 37 -3       Sweden 76 76 70 72 -6 
  UK 29 29 26 25 -14       UK 41 42 40 39 -6 
Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics, various issues 
Notes: 
1  The figures for Switzerland relate to 1984 and 1991 rather than 1985 and 1990. The 
latest figure for  each country the year is the same as that given in Table 1, except in the 
cases of Germany and Italy =1998, and Switzerland = 1999.  
2  Expenditure on goods and services only excludes interest payments on debt, subsidies 
and transfers out of the government sector and capital expenditure, all of which are 
predominantly the responsibility of central government. 
3  The %∆  column gives the percentage change in expenditure between 1985 and the latest 
date for which information is available. 
                                                                                                                                                        
6 This explains why the increase shown in Table 2 is not large. 
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In many respects the notion of ‘subsidiarity’, as proposed in the Maastricht Treaty and 
reasserted in the notion of bringing decisions as close as possible to the citizen in the 
Amsterdam Treaty, relates closely to this concept of efficiency in public service provision. It 
also gives subsidiarity an additional dimension, as it is argued that proximity to the citizen 
promotes involvement by citizens in the democratic process. Although the EU Treaties laid 
down criteria for the relationship between the EU and its member states, since then the notion 
of subsidiarity has received further impetus, both within individual EU states and the EU’s 
Committee of the Regions. It is now generally accepted that a move towards decentralisation 
may lead to a better outcome in matching services to local preferences and in encouraging 
citizenship. 
 
 However, as noted by Pola (1999), it is difficult to disentangle the extent to which the raw 
measures of fiscal expenditure decentralisation in Tables 1 and 2 really reflect local decision-
making. This is because official expenditure statistics on sub-national jurisdictions will 
sometimes include not only expenditure on functions assigned solely to that jurisdiction, but 
also ones where the local government is simply delivering a service that is effectively 
controlled by a higher tier of government. We have already noted earlier that central and sub-
national jurisdictions share competencies on a number of key public services. However, even 
if competencies are not explicitly shared, the degree of choice that local government has in 
key areas is limited if central government retains the right to direct the way in which services 
are provided, or if grants to local governments take the form of specific grants rather than 
block grants (Midwinter, 2001). Unfortunately there is little evidence across countries on the 
extent to which specific grants are used. Good examples of areas where direction often goes 
beyond simple guidance are health and education. Although these functions have been 
increasingly decentralised, central governments continue to see themselves as accountable to 
their electorate and will tend to use directives. This tendency to see sub-national governments 
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not as providers of public services, but as local agencies of state policies, can even be seen in 
federal states such as the USA in areas such as education (see Tanzi, 2001). 
 
Despite this caveat, the data seem to suggest that the UK does not offer its citizens a 
significantly more centralised form of public service provision than its European neighbours. 
Indeed, in many respects (see Table 1) the UK has imposed a much greater consistency on 
the shape of its local government by explicitly allocating functions to different tiers of 
government, generally avoiding clashes of competencies. In some respects Scotland also 
benefits from the fact that the remit of the Scottish Parliament with respect to devolved 
expenditures is clearly defined. As a devolved region Scotland is also unique in having much 
more exclusive control of functions such as education and health when compared to many EU 
unitary states. There is a more marked difference between the UK and other EU countries in 
the degree and nature of fiscal autonomy granted to its sub-central governments. 
 
Fiscal Autonomy: To What Extent should Sub-National Jurisdictions 
Control their Revenues? 
 
The Comparative Evidence 
This is a much more controversial area and one where the practice has varied considerably 
both within the EU and the OECD. Traditionally the UK has financed most of the spending 
of its sub-national jurisdictions through grants. Figure 1 shows that the UK makes less use of 
taxation to fund regional and local government spending than most European countries (the 
exceptions are the Netherlands and Ireland, which are geographically much smaller). 
However, these data tell a very partial story on the degree of fiscal autonomy given to sub-
national jurisdictions, as many other countries, including federal states like Germany and 
Austria, make extensive use of tax-sharing arrangements whereby regional and local 
authorities are given some share of the total tax yield. If the sub-national jurisdictions do not 
actually control either the tax base or the tax rates that generate the revenues they share with 
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central government, arguably the joint taxes are very similar to a block grant. Countries with 
such arrangements give very limited fiscal autonomy to their regional or local governments. 
Also, it should be recognised that, even where the yield of local taxes is returned fully to the 
sub-central governments, central government may still be able to limit the degree to which 
this fiscal autonomy is exercised. 
 
Figure 1: Composition of Sub-Central Government Revenues as a Percentage of 
General Government Revenues 
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 Grants      Taxes       Other 
Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics 2001 
Note: Figures relate to 2000 for Canada, Denmark and New Zealand; to 1999 for Australia, Austria, 
Sweden, Switzerland and the USA; to 1998 for Belgium, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Portugal, 
Norway, UK; and to 1997 for France and the Netherlands. 
 
 
In order to shed more light on the degree of fiscal autonomy enjoyed by lower levels of 
government, one has to look in detail at the extent to which sub-central governments can 
actually control taxation. A more systematic analysis of this is possible following the 
classification framework for local taxation developed by the Working Party on Tax Policy 
Analysis and Tax Statistics of the OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs. This has resulted in 
the publication of a number of studies on local taxation (see OECD 1999, 2001), which allow 
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us to develop a fuller picture of the extent to which fiscal autonomy differs across OECD 
countries7.  
 
A number of measures are given in OECD (1999). First, they indicate the extent to which 
sub-central governments rely on their own taxes, which gives a measure of how important 
local taxes are in the total tax burden of citizens. Second, they show the degree to which sub-
central governments control their own tax base or tax rates. The OECD classification system 
shows the percentage of sub-central taxation (by level of jurisdiction if there are more than 
two layers of government) which falls into one of eight categories of taxation. These range 
from type (a) sub-national taxes where the sub-central government can itself setboth the tax 
rate and tax base, to (e), where central government sets both the base and the rate of taxation. 
Category (d) captures tax-sharing arrangements, which in turn are divided into four 
categories: these range from (d.1) where the sub-central government can determine the 
revenue split, to the other extreme in (d.4) where national government can unilaterally decide 
the revenue split. 
 
In Figure 2, we summarise this evidence. The vertical axis plots the percentage of sub-central 
taxation in total taxation, so provides a measure of the importance of sub-central government 
in the financing of public services. The horizontal axis plots an overall index of ‘fiscal 
control’, which is an overall weighted index of the extent to which sub-central taxation is 
controlled locally. It follows that the countries closest to the north-east corner of the graph are 
those in which the sub-central governments have the greatest degree of fiscal autonomy:that 
is sub-national jurisdictions have control over a large share of total taxation and have greater 
control on taxation receipts. 
 
7 Although this data still  neglects some important issues. For instance, comparative data have not so far been 
collected on the extent to which sub-central governments face limits on change tax rates and the tax base (e.g. 
expenditure or revenue capping). 
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Figure 2: The Importance of Sub-Central Levels of Government and the Extent of 
Fiscal Control  
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Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics and OECD (1999) 
Note: Figures relate to 1995. Details on the construction of the Index of Fiscal Control are given in 
the appendix.. 
 
 
It is apparent that, although the UK’s local government layer has a reasonable degree of 
autonomy, the sub-central levels of government in the UK control a very small proportion of 
total taxation. In contrast, whilst sub-national jurisdictions in Scandinavia, Belgium and 
Japan have slightly lower degrees of fiscal control, the total importance of sub-central 
government is much greater. We also see some contrasts between federal states. Switzerland 
grants its sub-central governments the greatest control over taxation as indicated by the high 
percentage of sub-central taxation. In contrast, German and Austrian Länder have less fiscal 
control than might appear at first sight. 
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Figure 3: Fiscal Imbalances 
Tax and Non-Tax Revenues and Expenditure of Sub-Central Governments 
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Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics 
Notes: 
1.  Revenues include taxes, fees and other sources of non-tax revenues but exclude grants.  
2.  The figures are expressed as percentages of general government totals. Transfers from central 
government to lower tiers of government are excluded from the general government figure. 
3.  The date for which each country’s data is plotted is given in the notes to figure 1. 
 
 
Another indication of the extent to which governments have access to their own taxation 
resources to meet their expenditure commitments is given by Figure 3. This shows the degree 
of vertical imbalances present in the taxation and expenditure systems of various OECD 
countries. More specifically, Figure 3 plots the share of sub-central tax and non-tax revenues 
excluding grants against expenditure by sub-central governments, both given as percentages 
of the appropriate general government totals. The vertical distance between each point and 
the 45-degree line shows the extent to which sub-central jurisdictions are dependent on 
central government grants. We have shown two points for the UK, with UK1 showing the 
pre-devolution position and UK2, the situation after devolution (there is obviously no change 
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in the revenue position since the Scottish variable rate of income tax (‘the tartan tax’) has not 
yet been employed).  The graph shows that, amongst the unitary states, the UK relies mostly 
on grants and not on locally-raised revenues from taxes and fees. Apart from the federal 
states (Germany, Switzerland, the USA, Canada) unitary states such as Italy, France and the 
Scandinavian countries rely less than the UK on central government grants to finance their 
sub-central governments.  
 
Figure 4: Composition of Sub-Central Government Revenues in 1995 
as a percentage of General Government Revenues 
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 Grants and Tax Sharing      Sub-Central Taxes       Other 
Source: OECD (1999) 
 
However, we should remember the caveat about tax sharing which also applied to Figure 1: 
no distinction is made in Figure 3 between taxes under the control of sub-national 
jurisdictions and tax-sharing schemes. If one were to strip out tax sharing from this figure, 
federal countries like Germany and Austria would converge towards the unitary states. 
Nevertheless, the UK’s relative position would still be one where reliance on grants is greater 
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compared to other countries. This is shown in Figure 4,8 which clearly indicates that 
Scandinavia, Switzerland and New Zealand possess the greatest degree of fiscal autonomy. 
Even when grants and tax sharing are treated as equivalent, most EU countries provide 
greater autonomy to their sub-central governments than the UK does.  
 
Finally, the UK relies less than others on non-tax revenues (13%). These are mainly fees and 
charges on consumers for local and state government services. In this the UK is ranked lower, 
not only compared to federal States, but also compared with less-fiscally-devolved unitary 
states, such as Norway (17%). It is worth noting that devolution in the UK does allow the 
devolved authorities some margin to increase this reliance on non-tax revenues. 
 
The Optimal Degree of Fiscal Autonomy: What Does Economic Theory Say? 
 
The theory of fiscal federalism provides the following arguments for greater fiscal autonomy 
(Gramlich, 1984). First, it induces greater responsibility on local politicians. A reliance on 
central grants allows local politicians to lobby central governments for grants and might lead 
to allocation decisions that have little to do with economic efficiency. Second, a reliance on 
grants places little pressure on local administrators and politicians to manage local 
government spending efficiently: it is not apparent, at the margin, that an additional pound 
spent in local services will be equal to the benefit of an equivalent reduction in taxation. 
 
Is there evidence that sub-national governments behave inefficiently when they are in receipt 
of central grants? Some indirect evidence comes from the USA, where a considerable body of 
empirical evidence suggests that non-matching government grants have a much more 
powerful impact on local spending than increases in local income (Gramlich, 1977, Courant 
 
8 Unfortunately the data on tax sharing are not available for all countries (OECD, 1999), and therefore Figure 4 
has a smaller number of OECD countries than Figure 3. In addition, whilst Figure 3 presents the most recent 
data available in the relevant IMF publication, Figure 4 is restricted to presenting data for 1995 for consistency 
with the available OECD data. It is also worth noting that in Figure 4 Spain’s figures seemcomparatively low 
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et al., 1981), a phenomenon which has become known as the ‘flypaper effect’ (ie grant 
money sticks where it hits). The usual economic explanation for this observation is that local 
politicians will not be compelled to cut taxes in response to increases in grant, but will 
behave differently when local income increases and raises taxation yields. Although evidence 
on the ‘flypaper effect’ tends to be limited to federal countries where there is substantial 
fiscal autonomy, and therefore greater scope to test the hypothesis, it seems likely that local 
politicians tend to be more accountable with respect to local taxation decisions than centrally 
determined grant allocations. Unfortunately, beyond this indirect evidence, there is little 
comparative empirical evidence across OECD countries on whether there is over- or under-
provision of public services, and on whether there are significant differences in willingness to 
pay taxes to fund public services between sub-central governments in the UK and in other 
comparable countries. 
 
However, the literature on fiscal federalism also provides clear guidance on the limits that 
should be imposed on fiscal autonomy. Four arguments can be highlighted here. First, the 
usual argument against complete fiscal autonomy is one of equity9: jurisdictions with 
different levels of income and wealth will have very different tax resources at their disposal, 
and the need to ensure that citizens have access to a roughly equal level of public services 
will imply some degree of redistribution between sub-central governments. For this reason no 
industrialised countries, not even federal states, have opted for complete fiscal autonomy. 
Redistribution can be achieved either through the use of transfers funded from general 
taxation, or through some kind of ‘pooling’ arrangement between the sub-central 
governments, or by implementing tax-sharing arrangements designed to benefit poorer 
                                                                                                                                                        
because they pre-date the post-1996 reforms. 
9 We should distinguish the equity argument from that of insurance over the business cycle. Maintaining a 
centralised system of welfare benefits will allow a system of insurance to be maintained even in the presence of 
substantial fiscal autonomy.  
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jurisdictions. The key point is that there is a trade-off between equity and accountability: if 
resources are shared equally between sub-central governments, the incentive effects from 
fiscal autonomy disappear. This has become one of the central issues that countries have 
faced in deciding on the appropriate level of fiscal autonomy for sub-central tiers of 
government. 
 
The second argument against complete fiscal autonomy is that one has to avoid tax 
externalities, in the interests of economic efficiency. ‘Tax exportation’ (McLure, 1967) is one 
such problem. If taxation decisions by sub-central governments impinge on non-residents, 
then local residents and politicians will not internalise the costs of public services and there 
will be a degree of over-provision. In essence the same problems caused by grants re-emerge. 
Of course, insofar as non-residents benefit from service provision, then there could be under-
provision, a problem that often arises with large metropolitan areas and satellite towns. The 
way to deal with this problem is to ensure that different types of taxes are assigned to 
different levels of government so as to avoid tax exportation between sub-national 
jurisdictions. Indeed, this is a key argument for not devolving natural resource taxation. The 
dangers arising from not centralising tax decisions on natural resources are two-fold: that it 
would lead to tax exportation; and that resource-rich regions and central governments would 
both seek to compete for the taxation revenues, leading to excessive taxation on the natural 
resource. For example, suppose that a royalty tax on oil and gas were assigned to the sub-
central government, whilst the central government could also tax the same natural resource 
through taxes on corporate profits. This leads to both tiers of government excessively taxing 
the same base. 
 
A third limit on fiscal autonomy is a consequence of the potential migration of factors of 
production. Tax competition is a fact of life in most federal systems, and the mobility of 
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capital and labour imposes natural limits on fiscal autonomy. This is why most decentralised 
taxation systems still assign the majority of ability-to-pay or redistributive taxes to central 
government, especially taxes such as corporation taxes, which fall on the most mobile factor, 
capital. Although income taxation tends to be used by sub-central governments in a large 
number of countries, both federal (eg USA) and unitary (eg Denmark, Italy and Sweden), the 
scope for this is either limited by law or by tax competition. Generally, sub-central 
governments have to rely on benefit taxes or user charges (based on the benefit consumers 
derive from local services), taxes on immobile factors such as property, or small changes in 
ability-to-pay taxes (such as local income tax), which do not cause migration in the tax base. 
 
Finally, a fourth argument against fiscal decentralisation is that it can generate administrative 
complexity. In essence, it is argued that managing a national tax system is feasible at lower 
cost and this implies that financing systems based on grants or tax-sharing arrangements are 
optimal. In fact, in the case of any modern developed economy, this is a spurious argument. 
There is no reason why one needs to decentralise the tax collection system, as evidenced by a 
number of OECD countries which manage the collection of taxes shared by different 
jurisdictions through a single national tax collection system. However, clearly if a national 
collection system had to cope with a plethora of shared taxes between jurisdictions, this 
would increase administrative costs. 
 
A subtler version of this argument relates to the problem of transparency and complexity in 
decentralised tax systems. A complex tax system, where various jurisdictions share the same 
tax base, and where sub-central governments have important fiscal powers, can lead to less 
transparency in the fiscal system. Voters may find it difficult to understand fully the 
operations of the different levels of government (Tanzi, 2001) and this leads to less 
accountability. 
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To sum up, economic theory suggests that some degree of fiscal autonomy renders policy-
makers more accountable, and could improve economic efficiency. Various commentators 
have also suggested that part of the crisis in democratic participation in local government 
elections in the UK is attributable to the lack of fiscal powers available to sub-central 
governments. For example, The Economist (2002) argues that the problem of democratic 
participation in local and devolved government will not be solved if the proposed English 
regional assemblies are granted few economic powers. Whether voter interest will dwindle in 
devolved government in Scotland and Wales in the absence of further devolution of fiscal 
powers remains to be seen.  
 
However, fiscal decentralisation is not without its problems. The choice of appropriate tax 
instruments for sub-central governments presents some problems in the light of issues such 
as: the mobility of factors of production across jurisdictions; the need to balance fiscal 
autonomy with some degree of revenue distribution between richer and poorer regions; and 
the need to avoid complexity. In the next section we examine some of the issues that have 
arisen in some other OECD countries, and the potential lessons for the UK from these 
experiences. 
 
Some Features of Decentralisation in OECD Countries 
Equity versus Accountability 
The presence of vertical transfers between central and sub-central levels can lead to a lack of 
accountability on the part of sub-central governments. An interesting case study in fiscal 
decentralisation is that of Italy. In the 1970s, Italian sub-central governments (communes, 
provinces, and regions) depended to a much greater extent on local taxes. Tax reforms in the 
early 1970s were designed both to reduce the complexity of the tax system, and to increase 
the degree of fiscal control retained by central government during a period of macroeconomic 
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crisis. Since 1992, this trend has been reversed, progressively greater fiscal autonomy has 
been granted to sub-central governments, and has been accompanied by a corresponding 
reduction in transfers. Between 1993 and 2000 a number of different tax reforms have been 
introduced, involving experimentation with various types of sub-central taxation, ranging 
from health taxes to a tax on business value added (IRAP)10 and an income tax (IRPEF) 
surcharge. 
 
Despite this, vertical transfers through conditional grants are still an important feature of 
Italian public finances. One problem that has emerged in Italy is a clear tension between 
equity and accountability when spending functions relating to key public services have been 
devolved. The main areas of tension have been in health and transport, where the regions 
have key responsibilities for delivering services. Regional governments which overspent their 
budgets in these areas were effectively bailed out by central government. Thus, the system of 
vertical transfers rewarded high and inefficient sub-central governments. (To date, despite 
reforms in 1993 and 2000, the Italian government has found it almost impossible to reform 
the allocation of central grants to reflect objective factors rather than historic allocations, and 
to exclude the possibility of bail-out.)  
 
 As Bordignon (2000) and Bosi and Tabellini (1995) note, this led to a clear problem of 
‘moral hazard’, with regions blissfully running spending overruns in key areas like health, 
knowing that the central government would bail them out. The Italian case is an extreme 
 
10 Note that this is a tax levied on business value added, and not a regional VAT scheme, which would not have 
been approved by the European Commission. After IRAP was introduced in 1998, to replace the regional health 
payroll tax, a two-year transition period was envisaged during which central government continued to set rates 
(see Bordignon, 2000, Bibbee and Goglio, 2002). 
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example, due to the particular administrative framework11 that allowed budget overruns and a 
political situation that encouraged bail-outs. But it serves to illustrate that, if central 
government is intent on maintaining the level of key public services, sub-central governments 
can exert real pressures on central government to increase vertical transfers, unless these are 
explicitly prohibited by law. This is particularly the case where there are overlapping 
competencies in the provision of some public services, or where central government is seen 
by the electorate as responsible for the delivery of key services. Of course, central 
government can always resort to using earmarked grants, thereby further eroding local 
accountability. In essence, there appears to be a real trade-off between equity in the provision 
of public services and the accountability of devolved government. 
 
The trade-off between equity and accountability is not only evident in countries like Italy that 
are trying to move towards a more federal structure. It is also apparent in counntries with 
mature federal systems, such as Germany. Post-war Germany has had in place a system of 
horizontal equalisation aimed at equalising revenues between poorer and richer Länder (or 
states). This system of equalisation, the Finanzausgleich, has been very successful in 
maintaining a high degree of uniformity in public services throughout Germany. In 1997, 
following the incorporation of the East German Länder into the system, €6.1 bn was 
transferred from the richer to the poorer Länder, compared to only €1.5 bn in 1994. In 
addition to these horizontal transfers, in 1997 a number of federal grants were made to 
fiscally weaker Länder (€7.2 bn). Overall, 20% of Länder income came from grants, 
including transfer payments from the equalisation system. In 2001, a new agreement was 
 
11 There are loopholes in sub-central borrowing limits in Italy, particularly in health and transport (see Bibbee 
and Goglio, 2002). In addition, central governments have been unwilling to harden budget constraints for 
electoral reasons, and because it is widely recognised that the Southern regions and municipalities have poor 
administrative capacities, and may not be able to cope. This has resulted in the recent decision in 2000 to 
introduce a rule-based system of horizontal equalisation but to phase this in over a period of fourteen years. A 
counter to this point is that a persistence of moral hazard simply provides no incentives to these regions and 
municipalities to improve their capacity to manage their affairs. 
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reached for the period 2005-19 which maintains a federal contribution of about €10 bn per 
year. Some observers have argued that the extent of equalisation has led to a lack of 
accountability (see Spahn and Franz, 2000). But, despite a perceived need to incentivise the 
Länder to improve their economic performance and efficiency, equity remains the guiding 
principle of the new system. 
 
Complexity and Transparency 
If devolved government and fiscal autonomy is designed with the objective of increasing 
accountability, a complex system, where various jurisdictions compete for the same tax base, 
or where tax sharing is the norm, leads to far less transparency (Tanzi, 2001). As highlighted 
in Table 3, a number of jurisdictions in federal countries rely largely on tax-sharing 
arrangements (local authorities and Länder in Austria and Germany, Communities in 
Belgium, provinces, municipalities and regions (Autonomous Communities) in Spain). 
The Spanish experience is of interest, as they sought to introduce much greater fiscal 
autonomy for their sub-central governments, and particularly the Autonomous Communities 
(ACs) from 1993 onwards. In 1994 ACs relied on government grants or tax-sharing 
arrangements for up to 96% of their expenditure. In the period 1994-96 ACs were allowed to 
obtain a share of the personal income tax raised in their own territory, and they also began to 
make greater use of fees and user charges. By 1996, the percentage of own revenues in the 
ACs had risen to 18%. In 1997 a formal agreement, which is still in its implementation phase, 
increased the range of taxes available to ACs (on wealth and property transfers) as well as 
allowing them a greater share of their own revenues from personal taxation,12 with some ACs 
able to exercise control over tax credits and rates. However, the result is a complex tax 
system, especially when one considers that there are two lower tiers of local government 
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(provinces and municipalities), which also depend on shared taxes, as well as a host of local 
fees and duties. Arguably, although it is still evolving, the Spanish system has given rise to a 
complex tax system, which achieves greater autonomy at the expense of less transparency. 
 
Which Taxes should be Devolved? 
Earlier, we highlighted the main principles which should guide fiscal devolution: ie that 
devolved taxes should not have a redistributive function; that they should pay some regard to 
the problem of factor mobility; and that tax exportation should be avoided. As might be 
expected, most OECD countries that have opted for a substantial degree of fiscal autonomy 
have tended to allow sub-central governments greater control over benefit taxes or user 
charges (mainly taxes or fees/charges for local services) and property taxes, with limited 
control on taxes on more mobile factors (income and profit taxation) but almost no control 
over the taxation of the extraction of natural resources (royalties or profit taxation). The only 
exceptions are the USA and Canada, which traditionally allowed states some discretion to set 
natural resource taxes. Resource-rich countries in the EU have not devolved taxes on natural 
resources. 
 
Whilst some countries have devolved business taxes (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Italy, 
Spain, and Switzerland), these do not constitute a substantial share of regional/local revenues. 
These are countries where sub-central governments actually control local business tax rates or 
the tax base, i.e. they do not simply share in national corporate taxation revenues. Should the 
UK seek to grant more fiscal autonomy to its devolved authorities or to the English regions, it 
is unlikely that corporate taxation would be a serious candidate, given the mobility of capital. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
12 ACs receive a block grant of 15% of the income tax collected in the region, except where expenditures 
financed by the personal income tax revenues are lower than the amount of revenue that would be received. In 
these cases the share falls to 5-10%. Some  have the right to modify rates of tax and change tax credits. 
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A more likely candidate is the greater use of local income taxes, a principle already embraced 
to a limited extent in the tartan tax. Currently a number of European countries have granted 
autonomy to their sub-central governments to set rates of personal income taxation. For 
example, in Belgium, income tax surcharges are used; in Denmark, Finland and Sweden, 
Italy and Switzerland regional/local government can set personal income tax rates; and in 
Spain, a more asymmetric system exists with some proportion of personal income taxation 
returned to the region of origin. 
 
The Scandinavian experience is particularly instructive. In Denmark, the two tiers of sub-
central government, counties and municipalities, account for about 60% of total spending. 
Own taxation constitutes a large share of total revenues for the counties and municipalities (in 
1995 this was 82 and 76% respectively), only a small amount comes from shared taxation 
(see European Communities 2001) or block grants. However, block grants are used to enable 
some degree of horizontal equalisation. Whilst there are no formal limits to the size of local 
income taxes, in a small country the effective freedom to vary personal income taxation is 
limited by factor mobility. In addition, Denmark has operated a system of close budgetary co-
operation between central and local government, through the Ministry of Finance. There were 
annual negotiations, involving a joint assessment of the budgetary requirements of sub-
central governments, based on no changes in tax rates. However, in 1998 a new four-year 
agreement was put in place. Thus, in theory the system combines a degree of local self-
determination, with a considerable degree of co-ordination and bargaining, which tends to 
limit the changes to local tax rates. 
 
Whilst the Danish system provides an interesting model, which has received widespread 
attention (Russell Barter, 2000, STUC, 2001), it does have some weaknesses. The problems 
with the Danish system are two-fold. First, the process of budget cooperation is not binding 
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on local authorities. From 1999-2001 actual income tax rate increases were about 1.5% 
(Daugaard, 2002) and since 1986 ‘unplanned’ tax rate increases have amounted to 4%, 
leading to a severe loss of credibility for the central government’s fiscal control. The surge in 
public consumption expenditure has been largely in areas such as childcare and care of the 
elderly (Daugaard, 2002). A second problem is that the small size of some of the 
municipalities (their average population is 19,000 inhabitants) means that economies of scale 
in the provision of services cannot be exploited. Furthermore, some municipalities lack the 
professional administrative structures to carry out a wide range of public functions, ranging 
from the administration of social security benefits through to environmental protection. 
Overall, the problems in the Danish system are attributable to an excessive degree of 
autonomy rather than to problems in the operation of a local income tax system. Many of the 
issues highlighted in recent reviews of the Danish public sector have pointed to problems of 
size of sub-central government and the assignment of expenditure functions. 
 
Finland has a similar system of autonomous income taxation for municipalities (tax rates in 
the municipalities in 1998 were between 15-20%) combined with a degree of co-ordination. 
There is close co-operation between municipalities on a regional basis to organise joint 
welfare provision (especially in the areas of health and education). Municipalities can also 
levy capital taxation on net wealth and real property taxes. In Sweden, own taxes constitute 
about 55% of municipality revenues and 70% of county revenues. However, in the early 
1990s much stronger central control was exerted on local government: a cap was imposed on 
tax rates between 1991-93 and from 1997 central government took a 50% share of any 
increase in tax revenue. As in the Danish case, excessive fiscal autonomy can be seen as a 
problem in terms of overall budgetary control, especially when the sub-central jurisdictions 
are small in size resulting in less effective control over expenditure. 
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Overall, it seems that some countries that have adopted local income taxation have 
encountered difficulties with ‘excessive taxation’. However, to a large extent this is 
attributable to problems in the efficient delivery of public services and the absence of 
effective tax competition. High personal income taxation is not a natural consequence of 
fiscal autonomy, as should be evident from the experience of countries such as the US and 
Switzerland. In a recent empirical study comparing federal and non-federal states, Keen 
(1997) shows that, in general, there is no evidence that income taxation is higher in states 
where both national and sub-national (state/regional) governments co-occupy the same tax 
base. For the reasons already explored, any increase in fiscal autonomy in the UK would 
probably require some form of local income taxation for regional government, and the 
experience of Scandinavia suggests that a limited system of additional taxation might be the 
best way forward, combined with a system of horizontal equalisation. 
 
The wider economic impact of Tax Competition: empirical evidence 
The Scandinavian experience illustrates a key debate in the theory public finance: does 
decentralisation lead to smaller or bigger government, and what impact does it have on 
economic performance more generally? In setting out their ‘Leviathan hypothesis’, Brennan 
and Buchanan (1980) point out that factor mobility implies that decentralisation will lead to 
smaller government. Empirical evidence on this has been mixed at best (Oates, 1985), 
although a problem with early empirical studies is that they were based on cross-section data. 
Since many other factors affect government size, it is unlikely that cross-section studies can 
effectively test such a hypothesis. More recently, Rodden (2001) used panel data on 40 
countries over the period 1978-97 to revisit the hypothesis. Whilst the results are not 
unequivocal, Rodden does seem to find that there is an inverse correlation between greater 
fiscal autonomy and the size of the public sector, whilst higher proportions of sub-central 
expenditures financed through tax-sharing or central grants are shown to be correlated with 
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larger public sectors. However, one caveat from Rodden’s study, as he himself notes, is that, 
despite the use of panel data, the results are still driven by observations from some key 
federal states, such as the US, Canada and Switzerland. Rodden also finds significant 
evidence in favour of a ‘flypaper effect’, which is consistent with the hypothesis that 
countries which rely more on central grants will have bigger public sectors. 
 
Although one might try to infer some link between greater decentralisation and faster 
productivity growth, unfortunately it is difficult to find a formal statistical link between 
increasing fiscal autonomy/decentralisation and economic growth. As many other factors 
play a part in determining ‘catch-up’ in productivity, it is difficult to disentangle any effect 
due to greater autonomy. In an empirical study using panel data, Thiessen (2001) tries to 
establish a link between the degree of fiscal decentralisation and growth. As Thiessen 
recognises, the results are unlikely to be robust, given that the measure of fiscal 
decentralisation is rather arbitrary; he finds an inverse U-shaped relationship, whereby an 
intermediate degree of decentralisation is optimal for faster growth. This is then attributed to 
the fact that excessive decentralisation may cause a loss of economies of scale in public 
service provision. Given the preliminary nature of this work, it would be too simplistic to 
argue that there is an optimal degree of fiscal decentralisation from the point of view of 
maximising economic growth. 
 
Reforming Block Grants 
In the UK, the rationale and future of the Barnett formula in allocating funding to the 
devolved authorities in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has been the subject of 
considerable debate. The history and complexity of the formula has been discussed at length 
elsewhere (Twigger (1998); Bell (2001); Midwinter (2000); Cuthbert (2001); Muscatelli 
(2001)), and will not be covered here. Instead, we will focus on the extent to which other 
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OECD countries have relied on the use of historic shares or needs-based assessment to set 
grants for sub-central governments. From our discussion so far, it should be apparent that 
even those countries where sub-central governments have considerable fiscal autonomy (e.g. 
Sweden, Finland,and Denmark) have retained some system of central grants in order to 
provide some system of horizontal equalisation. Whatever any future devolution reform holds 
for the UK, there is likely to be a continued reliance on central government grants, and a 
comparison with other countries is instructive. Given the limited space available, we will 
focus on a limited number of examples grant systemsin operation in other countries. 
 
With very few exceptions, other European countries have moved away from formulae based 
on historic shares, such as the Barnett formulae, towards formulae that use objective 
parameters that measure fiscal need and tax-raising capacity. Perhaps the only exception to 
this rule is Italy, where for political reasons it has been very difficult to move towards a 
formula based on objective indicators of needs and costs in different municipalities. As noted 
above, the 2000 reform of regional financing, involving a switch to a needs-based horizontal 
equalisation system (based on demographic factors and potential per capita revenues from 
regional taxation), is to be phased in over a long period of time. 
 
The majority of other countries have made central government grants the centrepiece of some 
form of horizontal equalisation. We have already touched on the equity versus accountability 
trade-off raised by such equalisation schemes. 
  
Equalisation schemes take a variety of forms but often involve an element of central grant.  In 
some cases, such equalisation schemes are self-financing. For instance, in Sweden, since 
1996 a self-financing equalisation system has covered all the municipalities and counties. 
This system aims to offset 95% of the differences in taxable income per capita between local 
governments and allows for major differences in delivery costs. In Denmark, general grants 
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include both a self-financing equalisation mechanism and a grant payable to local authorities 
in which the tax base per capita is less than 90% of the national average. The amount of this 
second grant is based on expenditure need, and uses indicators such as pre-school and school-
age population (under 6 years old, 6-17 years old) and the elderly population (75 years and 
over) to take account of the major costs of childcare, schooling and care for the elderly. In 
addition, there is a role for social indicators such as the proportion of single-parent families, 
the unemployment rate, and the non-EU immigrant population. In Spain, as fiscal autonomy 
has progressively increased, a variety of grant formulae have been put in place. For ACs, the 
most important of these is a tax-sharing grant based on expenditure needs, as measured by 
population size, personal income, and tax capacity. In the case of provinces and 
municipalities additional criteria include surface area and school-age population. 
 
In France, where fiscal autonomy is more limited and sub-central government (regions, 
departments and communes) rely for a third of their funds on central government grants, the 
main grant (Dotation Globale de Fonctionnement) uses objective factors based on need 
(population, school population, tourist numbers, and fiscal capacity). Separate allocations are 
made for capital grants (Dotation Globale d’Equipement) which tend to match investment by 
communes and departments, supporting local initiatives. 
 
Of course, the UK has always had a system of grant allocation based on fiscal need for local 
government, but it has resisted any reform of the Barnett formulae for the allocation of block 
grants to its main devolved regions. In doing this, it remains, with Italy, one of the few 
countries that have resisted the trend towards needs-based formulae and stuck with history 
and political expediency. However, it should be recognised that any further move in the UK 
towards financial autonomy for its main devolved units will bring with it a need to address 
the issue of horizontal equalisation and will require some reform of the grant system. Further 
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progress on the devolution agenda, such as regional government in England, will also bring 
the issue of needs assessments to the fore. 
 
Borrowing Constraints and Local and Regional Government 
The extent to which sub-national governments in different OECD countries can borrow also 
varies substantially. Figure 5, which plots an index of borrowing autonomy taken from 
Rodden (2001), shows that the UK imposes relatively strict controls on borrowing by sub-
central governments. 
 
Figure 5: Index of Borrowing Autonomy - Sub-Central Government 
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Source: Rodden (2001) 
Notes: The index is bounded between 1 and 5 where 1 = no borrowing autonomy and 5=high 
borrowing autonomy and the period assessed is 1986-1996 where feasible. The light bar relates to 
the local level of government where these figures are available. The darker bars relate to 
state/regional level government. 
 
 
To some extent these differences hide the fact that, in most countries, the state exerts 
considerable control on total borrowing. For instance, in Germany, Länder and local 
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authorities can only borrow for investment purposes, in proportion to their financial capacity, 
and subject to agreement by the Land’s interior ministry. Spain imposes similar limits to total 
debt service spending and only allows short-term borrowing to cover cash-flow requirements 
and long-term borrowing to finance public investment projects. It is interesting to note that 
there is sometimes little relation between the degree of decentralisation in spending and 
borrowing autonomy. For instance, in France regional and local authorities have considerable 
latitude in deciding how much to borrow for capital expenditure, although borrowing is not 
allowed to cover current expenditure or to refinance existing loans.  
 
Another important point to note is that the Maastricht criteria, and subsequently the Stability 
and Growth Pact, have forced some countries to bring in greater controls over borrowing by 
sub-central governments. For instance, Austria introduced an ‘internal’ Stability Pact in 
January 1999 to help ensure that the overall deficit position for all levels of government does 
not exceed 3%. This is done by allowing very little margin for borrowing by sub-central tiers 
of government, who are only permitted to run  an aggregate deficit of 0.3% of GDP. Italy has 
imposed a similar ‘internal pact’. One problem with such ad hoc solutions is that they might 
place too my much of a constraint on public investment, as borrowing is typically only 
undertaken for capital projects. This is a well-known criticism of the EU Stability and 
Growth Pact in contrast to the ‘golden rule’ for borrowing adopted in the UK. 
 
If the UK were to introduce greater fiscal autonomy for its devolved authorities, and if this 
were followed by entry into EMU, greater constraints might be imposed on the spending of 
sub-central government. Presently, the Scottish Parliament faces the same constraints as a 
central government department ie it is possible to carry over underspending, and limited 
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overspending is allowed via the Reserve13.  However, if the UK is to adopt the Stability and 
Growth pactin the future, this may result in less flexibility for three-year spending plans. 
 
Asymmetric and Multi-speed Reforms 
Another feature of UK devolution is its asymmetric nature. The three devolved territories 
have been granted different political and economic powers. Whilst the blueprints for English 
Regional Government are not entirely clear, it is already apparent that the ultimate pattern of 
devolution in the UK will not be symmetric. This is explicitly recognised in Russell Barter 
(2000, p. 23), which in fact exalts this as a virtue of UK devolution: 
 
“Not all regions need necessarily to have the same powers at the same 
time…Indeed the Council of Europe argue that time-lags may meet some 
regions’ needs to avoid taking on responsibilities they are not yet ready to bear” 
 
The comparison with Italy is often made. There, five special status regions (Regioni a Statuto 
Speciale) havetraditionally had greater devolved powers. Spain is also a good example where 
the three historic Basque Country territories: Alava, Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, along with Navarra 
have their own special tax regimes and a separate economic agreement with central 
government. In Finland, the thinly populated Åland region has separate political and 
budgetary powers. 
 
However, Russell Barter (2000) does recognise some weaknesses in asymmetric devolution 
settlements. In Spain asymmetry has led to considerable administrative and fiscal complexity, 
 
13  See HM Treasury (2002): "…the presumption is that departments and the devolved administrations will 
contain pressures on their budget by re-allocating priorities, seeking offsetting savings and using unspent 
entitlements... The devolved administrations will be treated in the same manner as United Kingdom departments 
in decisions on access to the DEL Reserve…" (Section 9) "There is eligibility on EYF for DEL expenditure but 
AME expenditure is not eligible. The whole DEL assigned budget of each devolved administration will 
therefore be eligible for end-year flexibility... Breaches in DELs which materialise at the end of the year would 
be viewed by the United Kingdom Government as serious mismanagement on the part of the devolved 
administration and the presumption would be that the following year's DEL and grant to the devolved 
administration would be reduced by an amount equivalent to the breach. The same rule applies to departments 
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as noted above. Some political scientists (Le Galès and John, 1997) argue that 
incrementalism carries with it considerable costs in terms of loss of momentum for reform. 
Of course, the opposite problem can also arise, with asymmetries leading to arguments for 
further change. In Italy, part of the federalist movement has been pushing for similar 
autonomies to be granted to all regions to bring the asymmetric treatment of regions to an 
end. Another risk is that, where some regions are granted greater powers because of historical 
reasons or cultural diversity, granting some regions greater powers than others may lead to 
tensions between regions, and then create difficulties in implementing horizontal equalisation 
systems. Even where asymmetric devolution settlements are justified for historical reasons 
(e.g. maintaining a separate Scottish education or legal system), our view is that these 
exceptions should be explicitly costed as part of a comprehensive regional financing system 
and that, apart from these exceptional factors, similar degrees of fiscal autonomy should be 
allowed to all future regional governments in the UK. This would then avoid the tensions that 
mightotherwise arise from a multi-speed path to devolution in some regions (e.g. the 
Northern English regions) if they are granted much less fiscal powers than Scotland. 
 
Conclusions 
We have surveyed some of the experiences of the OECD economies in the area of fiscal 
decentralisation and fiscal autonomy andhave highlighted possible lessons for the UK as it 
considers the future path of its devolution process. In general, we can draw the following 
conclusions: 
 
• Economists have traditionally seen some benefits in fiscal autonomy, on the grounds that 
it promotes efficiency in local government and accountability. 
                                                                                                                                                        
of the United Kingdom Government." (Section 10). 
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• However, the evidence from other countries is that fiscal autonomy is not costless. 
Conflicting competencies in spending, and competition over the tax base, can easily 
destroy some of the potential benefits of fiscal autonomy. This suggests that any fiscal 
decentralisation has to be carefully designed to be transparent, with clearly defined 
competencies for different jurisdictions. 
• Most countries that have granted a greater degree of fiscal autonomy to its regions have 
done so through a greater delegation of taxes on immobile factors, on personal income, 
and through non-tax measures (fees and charges to consumers of local services). 
Devolving income taxationto sub-central government raises the problem of factor 
mobility in the absence of effective tax competition. However, in the case of the UK the 
limited evidence that exists (see Blow et al., 1996) suggests that migration may be less of 
a problem than some observers fear and, to date, there is little evidence from other OECD 
economies that small tax differentials have led to major movements in population. 
• Any increase in fiscal autonomy will increase the need for some system of horizontal 
equalisation if a degree of equal access to public services is to be maintained. The 
evidence from other OECD countries is that such shifts in resources can be substantial, 
and this finding is also backed up by the limited evidence available for the UK (Blow et 
al., 1996). 
• However, excessive degrees of fiscal equalisation (e.g. through full tax-sharing) can 
militate against the gains in accountability deriving from fiscal autonomy. Countries that 
have placed considerable emphasis on interjurisdictional solidarity (e.g. Germany and 
Italy) face problems in achieving a better balance between equity and fiscal 
accountability. 
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• The use of central grants as part of a horizontal equalisation scheme has to pay regard to 
both expenditure needs and fiscal capacity of local government. In general, the OECD has 
seen both greater movement towards fiscal autonomy, and a move towards the 
assessment of local needs in determining grants. More transparent formula-based grant 
allocations are also likely to increase fiscal transparency. 
What lessons emerge from the UK’s perspective? A major criticism of the UK’s current 
arrangements for devolved public finance is that they do not deliver either the benefits of 
accountability derived from assigning greater fiscal autonomy to the sub-central tiers of 
government, or the benefit of ensuring common levels of access to public services across the 
UK. In facing the trade-off between fiscal autonomy and equity, the UK has chosen a 
historical solution and political expediency. There are two potential dangers in not reforming 
the current arrangements for devolved financing. The first is that the electorate will begin to 
lose interest in the devolution process and electoral participation will continue to decline, 
instead of reinvigorating the local democratic process. The second is that pressures will 
develop to reform the system, and that regional tensions will emerge, especially once regional 
assemblies begin to be set up in England. This is exactly what has happened in some other 
countries (e.g. Italy, Spain) to date. Cross-country experience suggests that there may be 
considerable benefits to the UK (and Scotland) in confronting the issue of fiscal autonomy 
and inter-regional solidarity sooner rather than later. 
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Appendix 
Construction of the Index of Fiscal Control [as used in Figure 2] 
 
The index of fiscal control comprises a weighted average index measuring the tax raising 
autonomy of state and local governments, multiplied by the magnitude of these respective 
taxation revenues. The information required to construct the weights is derived from OECD 
(1999).  
 
Indicators of Tax autonomy Weight 
State/Local government free to set both tax rate and tax base. 1 
State/Local government free to set tax rate only. 0.8 
State/Local government free to set tax base only. 0.6 
State/Local government able to determine revenue-split in tax sharing 
arrangement with higher levels of government. 
0.5 
Revenue split in tax sharing arrangement with higher level of government 
requires consent of State/Local government. 
0.4 
Revenue split in tax sharing arrangement is fixed, but can be unilaterally altered 
by higher level of government. 
0.3 
Revenue split in tax sharing arrangement is determined by higher level of 
government in their annual budget. 
0.2 
Higher level of government sets both tax rate and base.  0 
 
For example: 
For Poland, a country with a central and local government structure, 45% of taxation is in 
category (b), 1% category (c) and 54% category (d.3), the index is obtained as follows:   
Index of fiscal control = 0.45*0.8 + 0.01*0.6 + 0.54*0.3 = 0.528 
Alternatively, for a country with a central, state and local government structure, eg. 
Switzerland the index takes account of the ratio of state vis-à-vis local taxation revenues:  
Communities:  0.97*0.8 + 0.03*0.3 = 0.785 
Cantons:  0.89*1 + 0.06*0.4 + 0.05*0.3 = 0.929 
Index of fiscal control =  (16/38)*0.785 + (22/38)*0.929 = 0.868. 
